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1 Executive Summary
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This seminar brought together leading researchers from computer and social science, poli-
cymakers, and representatives from industry to discuss the issue of “Verifiable Elections
and the Public”. The purpose was to present new research, develop new interdisciplinary
approaches for studying election technologies, and to determine ways to bridge the gap
between research and practice. This seminar built upon the foundation provided by an
earlier Dagstuhl seminar in 2007: Frontiers of Electronic Voting, Seminar number 07311,
http://www.dagstuhl.de/07311.
The initial sessions of the seminar were devoted to a conceptual discussion of verifiable
voting, and to a summary of the apparent obstacles associated with implementing innovations
in election technology. There was a general sense from most seminar participants that while
great progress has been made in development of verifiable voting systems, there has not been
as much progress towards testing, implementing, and deploying these new voting systems.
Additionally, the research community would like to be more involved in policymaking and
the practice of election administration. In particular, a panel discussion regarding obstacles
to innovation was quite productive, outlining several reasons for this feeling that insu cient
progress has been made, including politics, a lack of interest on the part of voters, legal and
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regulatory confusion, a lack of sensitivity to the training and incentives of election o cials,
and a sense that some e orts to innovate have been overly ambitious and complex.
After a productive discussion of obstacles to innovation, seminar participants heard talks
about a variety of recent evoting and Internet voting trials and projects. These included
talks on developments in Australia, Brazil, India, Estonia, Switzerland, and Norway, as well
as discussion of voting technology implementations in two U.S. counties: Cuyahoga, Ohio
and Sarasota, Florida. These presentations provided a great deal of real-world information
on technological and practical issues regarding the implementation of new voting systems
throughout the world.
Substantial time was devoted to the presentation of new voting systems. Some of
these presentations regarded innovative new conceptual and hardware schemes, including
new protocols for elections and ideas like using smartphones as voting platforms. Other
presentations focused on advancement and elaboration of existing voting systems, for example
further development of voting systems like Helios, Wombat, Prêt à Voter, and Scantegrity.
All of these presentations documented the significant progress that has been made in the
scientific community, in terms of development and elaboration of important cryptographic
and procedural protocols for voting, as well as new ideas for potential uses of technology in
elections.
One of the most exciting new developments since the earlier 2007 Dagstuhl seminar has
been the implementation and testing of some of the new voting systems that are under
development. These include implementations of Helios and Wombat, and also a systematic
usability and understandability project regarding Prêt à Voter. These e orts are providing
important data that is aiding in the continued development of these and other related new
voting systems.
Voting online continues to expand throughout the world, as was widely discussed during
talks on projects in Estonia, Norway, and Switzerland. And many of the talks about new
voting systems regarded new protocols that can be deployed online, like the extension of
Scantegrity to remote online use (“Remotegrity”). Presentations about these projects came
from social scientists, technologists, and policymakers.
At the same time, there continue to be important questions raised from researchers about
voting online, focusing largely on concerns about the security of online voting – specifically
including the challenges of making online voting coercion-resistant in a practical, convincing,
and usable way. These concerns fueled much discussion during the seminar, and it is clear
that more research about the voting systems being currently deployed, and those proposed
for use in the near future, is needed.
Concern is growing in the research community about how to maximize the impact of the
considerable body of research that has accumulated in recent years. Seminar participants
raised concerns about ways to improve the science of studying election technology, as well as
methods to improve connections and collaborations between the scientific and policymaking
communities. These issues will continue to intensify in the near future, and we hope that the
discussions at this Dagstuhl seminar will fuel progress in the development of new scientific
opportunities for research and dissemination, as well as closer collaboration between scientists
and policymakers.
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3 Overview of Talks
3.1 Update on U.S. Internet Voting Demo Project, Information on
UOCAVA Solutions Summit
David Beirne (Federal Voting Assistance Program, Arlington, US)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© David Beirne
URL http://www.dagstuhl.de/mat/Files/11/11281/11281.BeirneDavid1.Slides.pdf
Pursuant to the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act, the United States Depart-
ment of Defense through its Federal Voting Assistance Program is charged with the conduct
of an internet voting demonstration project for a statistically significant population.
3.2 VeriScan
Josh Benaloh (Microsoft Research – Redmond, US)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Josh Benaloh
Verified Optical Scan (or VeriScan) is a voter front end that can be used to build a fully
(end-to-end) verifiable election system. It allows voters to use ordinary optical scan ballots
and slightly enhanced precinct optical scanners to create a verifiable tally which augments
rather than replaces the traditional optical scan tally. The design is simple and familiar to
voters and ensures that any discrepancy between the two tallies immediately implicates the
optical scanner as malfunctioning. The benefits of full verifiability are obtained with minimal
privacy risks – even in the event of complete cryptographic failure.
3.3 Revisiting individual verifiability
Sergiu Bursuc (University of Birmingham, GB)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Sergiu Bursuc
Joint work of Bursuc, Sergiu; Grewal, Gurchetan S.; Ryan, Mark D.;
Main reference Sergiu Bursuc, Gurchetan Grewal, Mark Ryan, “Trivitas: Voters directly verifying votes,”
Proceedings of the VOTE-ID conference, 2011, Springer LNCS, to appear.
Individual verifiability has emerged over the last few years as a fundamental property
necessary for the public take-up of E-voting systems. Roughly, it should convince each voter
that his vote has been correctly handled by the voting system: by the voting machine, by
the communication network, by the bulletin board, by the talliers and by any other party
involved in the election. In the end, the voter should be convinced that his vote has been
counted in the final tally.
However, individual verifiability in most current E-voting systems is either incomplete (it
is not end-to-end: it does not cover all the path traversed by the vote) or is indirect (it relies
on trusted third parties, on complex math and/or on dedicated software). It is true that
these limitations are due to a tension between individual verifiability and coercion-resistance,
but is it really the case that we can not to better?
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We propose the notion of audit ballots, that allow the voter to track the handling of
an audit vote from the voting phase and up to the counting phase, thus providing more
intuitive individual verifiability. Because an audit vote is independent from the real vote of
a voter, audit ballots do not compromise coercion-resistance. We show how audit ballots
can be introduced in Helios, Prêt à Voter and JCJ/Civitas, without complicating the voter
experience.
3.4 Attacking and fixing privacy in Helios
Veronique Cortier (INRIA – Nancy, FR)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Veronique Cortier
Joint work of Cortier, Veronique; Smyth, Ben;
Main reference Veronique Cortier, Ben Smyth, “Attacking and Fixing Helios: An Analysis of Ballot Secrecy,”
Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF 2011), pages 297–311,
2011.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2011.27
Helios 2.0 is an open-source web-based end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system, suitable
for use in low-coercion environments. In this talk, we analyse ballot secrecy and discover a
vulnerability which allows an adversary to compromise the privacy of voters. The vulnerability
exploits the absence of ballot independence in Helios and works by replaying a voter’s ballot
or a variant of it, the replayed ballot influences the election outcome, introducing information
that can be used to violate privacy. We demonstrated the practicality of the attack by
breaking privacy in a mock election using the current Helios implementation. Moreover, the
feasibility of an attack is considered in the context of French legislative elections and, based
upon our findings, we believe it constitutes a real threat to ballot secrecy in such settings.
We present a fix and show that our solution satisfies a formal definition of ballot secrecy
using the applied pi calculus. In addition, we discuss the relationship between independence
and privacy properties.
3.5 CRAVE: A Challenge Response Application to Voting Electronically
Jeremy Epstein (SRI – Arlington, US)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Jeremy Epstein
Internet voting is widely promoted in the U.S. as a way to improve voter turnout, especially
by military and overseas voters, but security has been the primary obstacle to adoption,
especially for marked ballot return. In this presentation we describe CRAVE, a variant on
code voting using commercially available low-cost challenge-response devices as a means
to allow accurate marked ballot return, even in the face of malware running in the voter’s
browser or elsewhere on her computer. The goal of CRAVE is to explore the range of user
interfaces that can be used successfully by voters that improve security in the real world; it
is not intended to address the full range of voting characteristics such as those addressed by
cryptographic End-to-End systems.
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3.6 Validation of User Models: Should e-voting machine development
be driven by Murphy’s Law?
Paul Gibson (Telecom – Evry, FR)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Paul Gibson
Verifying that an e-voting system works correctly requires making assumptions about the
environment in which the system is used.
In particular, one must model the users of the system and validate that this model
corresponds to some reality. However, from our experience in developing a novel voting
interface, we have observed that such models are particularly di cult to build and validate.
Through a number of iterations and experimental observations we planned to converge
towards a better user model, and - as a consequence - a better user interface.
Unfortunately, our understanding of the voting system environment has been recently
compromised when we considered untrusted users: those users whose behaviour cannot be
trusted to follow the assumptions that we make. It appears that no matter how much one
anticipates the behaviour of untrusted users, Murphy’s law for user modelling rules supreme:
“If your model of user behaviour can be invalidated it will be invalidated”.
3.7 Secure Internet Voting on an Untrusted Platform
Rolf Haenni (Bern University of Applied Sciences, CH)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Rolf Haenni
Many di erent electronic voting protocols have been developed during the last two decades.
Most of them assume the secure platform problem to be solved.
Applying them for voting over the Internet with voters using their PCs or notebooks
is therefore problematic. Malicious software installed on these devices can easily harm the
integrity and secrecy of the vote. One approach to solve the secure platform problem in
this context is to distribute trusted devices to the voters. We discuss the design and the
properties of such a device from a practical perspective in terms of usability, security, and
cost.
3.8 Security Problems in India’s Electronic Voting System
J. Alex Halderman (University of Michigan, US)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© J. Alex Halderman
Joint work of Wolchok, Scott; Wustrow, Eric; Halderman, J. Alex; Prasad, Hari K.; Kankipati, Arun; Sakhamuri,
Sai Krishna; Yagati, Vasavya; and Gonggrijp, Rop
Main reference Scott Wolchok, Eric Wustrow, J. Alex Halderman, Hari K. Prasad, Arun Kankipati, Sai Krishna
Sakhamuri, Vasavya Yagati, Rop Gonggrijp, “Security Analysis of India’s Electronic Voting
Machines,” Proc. 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS’10), pp.
1–14, Chicago, IL, October 2010
URL http://indiaevm.org
India uses paperless electronic voting machines (EVMs) for its state and national elections.
These machines use a simple embedded system architecture that makes them considerably
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di erent from the complex electronic voting systems found in the U.S. and Europe (where
almost all prior research has focused). Despite growing suspicions of fraud, Indian authorities
have never permitted a serious, independent review of the machines’ security.
Hyderabad-based engineer Hari Prasad spent a year trying to convince election o cials to
complete such a review, but they insisted that the government-made machines were “perfect,”
“infallible,” and “tamperproof.” Then, in February 2010, an anonymous source gave him
access to one of the machines for study. E-voting researchers J. Alex Halderman from the
University of Michigan and Rop Gonggrijp from the Netherlands join him in India for the
study. The team discovered that, far from being tamper-proof, the machines su er from
serious weaknesses that could be exploited to alter national election results.
Months of hot debate about these findings have produced a growing consensus that India’s
electronic voting machines should be scrapped, as well as nascent e orts to create a better
system. There have also been more disturbing developments: Prasad was arrested and jailed
in August by authorities demanding to know the identity of the anonymous source.
He has since been released on bail, and received the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s
Pioneer Award for his work.
In this talk, Halderman will describe the design and motivations behind India’s electronic
voting system, the technical problems, and the implications of the machines’ security weak-
nesses for voting technology in India and beyond. He’ll also discuss some of the formidable
practical challenges that India and many other democracies face in conducting elections.
Designing voting systems that provide transparency and security under these constraints
presents many open problems.
3.9 Digital Democratization: Su rage Expansion and the Decline of
Political Machines in Brazil
F. Daniel Hidalgo (University of California, US)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© F. Daniel Hidalgo
Transitions to democracy often included institutional reforms that extended the franchise
and reduced the capacity of incumbent governments to fraudulently manipulate elections.
While existing studies have provided substantial insight on the broad e ects of institutional
reforms, there is little systematic and comparable evidence on which democratizing reforms
were most consequential for political representation, as well as precise comparisons of their
e ects. To provide such evidence, I exploit the phased adoption of electronic voting in Brazil,
a reform that I find increased the e ective franchise in legislative elections by about 33%
and eliminated fraud in the vote counting process.
Because the reform was initially implemented in municipalities with an electorate over
an arbitrary threshold, I study its e ects using a “regression discontinuity” design, which
ensures a high degree of internal validity. The two distinct e ects of electronic voting - the
enfranchisement of illiterates and other low information voters and the elimination of fraud -
had consequences for the composition of the national legislature. Against the predictions
of recent economic models of democratization, I find that the enfranchisement of illiterates
and other low information voters caused a small increase in the vote shares of right-wing
candidates. More importantly, newly enfranchised voters were dramatically more likely to
cast a “party list” or partisan ballot as opposed to a personal or candidate ballot, which
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benefitted Brazil’s more programmatic and ideologically coherent parties. In states with
hegemonic conservative parties, I find that the introduction of electronic voting induced a
roughly 20 percentage point swing against “political machine” candidates, which I attribute
to the elimination of fraud. In these states, new voting technology resulted in a sharp increase
in political competition and harmed right-of-center candidates.
Overall, I argue that the most important consequences of the reform was the strengthening
of Brazil’s major parties and a weakening of dominant subnational conservative political
machines.
3.10 Internet Voting in the United States
Candice Hoke (Cleveland State University, US)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Candice Hoke
Within the United States, 60% of the States have approved voting methods for overseas
civilian and military voters that utilize the public internet for the return of voted (marked)
ballots. While most States require voting systems to undergo independent testing of their
vendors’ claims of security, voter privacy, accuracy and resiliency, the States have generally
not conceptualized these internet- facing systems as voting systems. The internet voting
systems have thus escaped independent certification reviews.
The largely unregulated free market approach permits vendors to overstate the security,
privacy and other attributes of these systems, and to conceal flaws, needed mitigations, and
defense in depth security steps needed for secure operation of the systems. The Federal
agency’s advocacy of all-electronic elections before the technology was proven to have reached
high assurance standards has played a major, regrettable role.
3.11 An E cient Implementation of a Highly Sound Voter Verification
Technique on a Smart Card and its Application to Internet Voting
Rui Joaquim (Polytechnic Institute of Lisbon/INESC-ID – Lisboa, PT)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Rui Joaquim
Joint work of Joaquim, Rui; Ribeiro, Carlos; Ferreira, Paulo
Main reference Rui Joaquim, Carlos Ribeiro, Paulo Ferreira, “Towards Trustworthy Internet Elections,” INESC-ID
Tec. Rep. 9/2011, February 2011.
URL http://www.inesc-id.pt/ficheiros/publicacoes/7135.pdf
Uncontrolled Internet voting is the most challenging scenario for electronic voting as the voter
uses an insecure/uncontrolled platform to vote. We present a solution to the insecure platform
problem of Internet voting using a tamper resistant device (e.g. smart card). However, we
do not just move the trust assumptions from the PC to the tamper resistant device, we have
completely removed all trust assumptions on the election integrity from both the PC and
the tamper resistant device by adding a highly sound voter verification technique to the vote
encryption [1]. Moreover, our system also uses a code voting approach to communicate the
voter’s choice to the tamper resistant device, which enables the voter to vote privately even
when using public computers, e.g. computers at a public library or at a cybercafé.
References
1 Rui Joaquim and Carlos Ribeiro. An E cient and Highly Sound Voter Verification Tech-
nique and its Implementation. Vote-ID 2011, Tallinn, Estonia, 2011. To appear.
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3.12 Encoding complex ballots
Hugo Jonker (University of Luxembourg, LU)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Hugo Jonker
Various end-to-end verifiable systems have been proposed in recent years. These systems
often rely on a predefined way of filling in the ballot. However, election systems vary from
country to country, and sometimes from region to region. We illustrate the problem by
means of two non-trivial systems (Luxembourgian general elections and German bundesland
elections). In both systems, voters not only get to express multiple benefits, but can vote
multiple times for the same candidate. In addition, there are shortcut options (voting for all
members of one party).
We outline one approach to reconcile the existing voter experience (which may be enshrined
in law) with the Prêt à Voter system.
3.13 How to Store Some Secrets
Reto Koenig (Bern University of Applied Sciences, CH)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Reto Koenig
The key idea of coercion-resistant electronic voting protocols is to allow voters to deceive the
adversary with faked credentials. Keeping up the deception under all possible circumstances
requires the voter to remember multiple high-entropy credentials. This obviously states a
hard problem for the human brain. We introduce the concept of a secret storing system,
which allows users to conveniently store multiple high-entropy credentials with low-entropy
passphrases in one single storage. Both the credentials and the passphrases can be chosen freely
and independently. We propose a concrete realisation of such a system using interpolation
polynomials over prime fields.
3.14 Election Observation of New Voting Technologies
Robert Krimmer (OSCE – Warszaw, PL)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Robert Krimmer
The use of information and communication technologies in elections has expanded considerably
in recent years. This development has however not been uniform across the OSCE. A growing
number of participating States have introduced New Voting Technologies (NVT) or are
considering it, while others have stopped and returned to traditional voting methods. NVT
have raised questions about the compliance of these new electronic systems with OSCE
commitments and international obligations for democratic elections. As a result, a number of
international organizations and institutions, including ODIHR, have been paying increased
attention to this issue.
Transparency and observation are cornerstones of OSCE election-related commitments.
They are necessary to ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting
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procedure, and that they are counted and reported honestly with the o cial results made
public.
However, NVT poses new challenges to the traditional and broadly accepted concepts
of transparency and accountability of election processes to election administrators, voters
and election observers. Hence, concerns about security and secrecy of the ballot as well as
the reliability of electronic voting have become the subject of public debate in a number
of countries, thereby influencing public perceptions and confidence in elections in general.
NVTs have so far not reached the same level of universal acceptance, trust and confidence
as paper voting. But NVT can help o er additional functionalities to elections that paper
ballots cannot, for instance in cases when counting is complicated due a large numbers of
concurrent elections, voting for the blind, etc.
Observing elections using NVT is a challenge. Electronic events are more di cult
to observe because specialized technical skills are needed. Electronic voting consists of
technological components that are not readily nor easily understood by the average observer.
There is a need for an ODIHR approach to NVT in a methodological framework that dovetails
with ODIHR overall methodological approach to election observation. It should also support
election advisers in their daily work regarding developments with regards to NVT.
3.15 Verification, Security, and Voter Understanding
Morgan Llewellyn (IMT – Lucca, IT)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Morgan Llewellyn
Joint work of Culnane, Chris; Heather, James; Llewellyn, Morgan; Schneider, Steve; Srinivasan, Sriram; Xia, Zhe
(Joson)
Currently, a variety of voting schemes seek to increase voter confidence by allowing voters
to verify that their vote has been recorded. Each of these voting systems assume that the
gain in confidence from verifying their vote is greater than any potential loss of confidence
resulting from voter beliefs that the verification process may reveal vote choice. Why this
assumption may be natural to computer scientists, it is possible that many voters do not
understand event basic ballot security features. It is in this context that we test individual
understanding of random candidate ordering in a Prêt à Voter style ballot form.
Individual understanding of the ballot form was done through a series of experiments
conducted at the University of Surrey. The goal of the experiments was to test individual
understanding of the security features provided by randomized candidate ordering. Results
indicate that a clear majority of participants understand the security features of randomized
candidate ordering. However, results also reveal that some individuals did not fully understand
the ballot security features and highlight the potential for attacks on user confidence resulting
from large N.
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3.16 The Limits of Theory: Assumptions on Which We Base Voting
Protocol Security
Tal Moran (Harvard University, US)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
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One of the contributions of computer science theory to voting security is the notion of
“security reductions”: the idea that we can reduce the security of a complex system to the
security of simpler components. This makes practical verification of security a more tractable
problem: if we can prove a security reduction, it is enough that we check the individual
components to be convinced that the system as a whole is secure. At the end of the day,
however, we are always left with security “axioms”: basic assumptions that we cannot reduce
further on which the security of the system relies.
When we evaluate and compare voting systems, in addition to looking at what they
provide, we should also be thinking about the basic assumptions they rely on.
I’ll describe some of the common assumptions on which we base end-to-end verifiable
voting systems and discuss their relation to reality.
3.17 Running mixnet-based elections with Helios
Olivier Pereira (UC Louvain-la-Neuve, BE)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Olivier Pereira
Joint work of Bulens, Philippe; Giry, Damien; Pereira, Olivier
Main reference Philippe Bulens, Damien Giry, Olivier Pereira, “Running Mixnet-Based Elections with Helios,”
Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/ Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE ’11),
2011.
URL http://www.usenix.org/event/evtwote11/tech/
The Helios voting system is an open-audit web-based voting system that has been used by
various institutions in real-stake elections during the last few years. While targeting the
simplicity of the election workflow, the homomorphic tallying process used in Helios limits its
suitability for many elections (large number of candidates, specific ballot filling rules, . . . ).
We present a variant of Helios that allows an e cient mixnet-based tallying procedure,
and document the various choices we made in terms of election workflow and algorithm
selection. In particular, we propose a modified version the TDH2 scheme of Shoup and
Gennaro that we found particularly suitable for the encryption of the ballots.
Our Helios variant has been tested in two multi-thousand voter elections. The lessons
taken from the first of these elections motivated some changes into our procedure, which
have been successfully experimented during the second election. Voter survey data are also
presented.
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3.18 Wombat in the wild
Ben Riva (Tel Aviv University, IL)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Ben Riva
We present a new electronic voting system called Wombat. Wombat is designed to be similar
to the current Israeli paper based elections and it combines a paper based voting system
with an electronic one, in a way that both systems complete each other.
We show the highlights of the protocol, briefly describe its implementation, and talk
about a pilot we ran in a student council election with over 2000 voters.
3.19 Prêt à Voter with Confirmation Codes
Peter Y. A. Ryan (University of Luxembourg, LU)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Peter Y. A. Ryan
Main reference to appear in the proceedings of EVT/WOTE 2011
A scheme is presented in which a Pretty Good Democracy style confirmation code mechanism
is incorporated into Prêt à Voter. The idea is to provide voters with an immediate, easy to
use confirmation at the time of casting of the correct registration of their receipt on the Web
Bulletin Board. As with PGD, the registration and revelation of the confirmation code is
performed by a threshold set of Trustees. Verification of the registration of the vote is now
part of the vote casting and therefore more immediate and convenient for the voters.
The scheme presented here is thus more convenient while maintaining the level of
verifiability of conventional Prêt à Voter. It also means that we are less reliant on the
diligence of voters in later performing checks on the Bulletin Board. It seems probable that
this confirmation code mechanism will provide voters with greater confidence that their vote
will be accurately tallied.
3.20 Focus Groups Study on Prêt à Voter
Steve Schneider (University of Surrey, GB)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Steve Schneider
Joint work of Schneider, Steve; Llewellyn, Morgan; Culnane, Chris; Heather, James; Srinivasan, Sriramkrishnan;
Xia, Zhe
Main reference Steve Schneider, Morgan Llewellyn, Chris Culnane, James Heather, Sriramkrishnan Srinivasan, Zhe
Xia, “Focus Groups Study on Prêt à Voter 1.0,” Proceedings of RE-Vote: International Workshop
on Requirements Engineering for Electronic Voting Systems Trento, Italy, 2011.
URL http://www.computing.surrey.ac.uk/personal/st/S.Schneider/papers/2011/RE-Vote11.pdf
This presentation discussed the findings of a series of four focus group sessions carried out
in the UK on a variant of the original Prê tà Voter verifiable voting system prototype
implementation. The aim of these sessions was to investigate users’ ability to use the system,
to discover any inadequacies of the system, and to gauge the participants’ understanding of
its security mechanisms. Participants were asked to use the system to cast a vote, to audit
their ballot forms and to confirm online that their vote had been received.
The groups also discussed general issues around security in election systems.
While voters were able to cast their votes reliably, some displayed less understanding of
the security procedures they were required to carry out.
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3.21 Some ideas about receipt-free cast-as-intended Internet voting
for preferential elections
Vanessa Teague (The University of Melbourne, AU)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Vanessa Teague
We discuss whether a remote electronic voting system might provide both strong privacy
properties and strong verification that the vote was cast as intended.
We speculate on some weaker alternatives to full receipt freeness and how they might be
achieved. For example, it seems reasonable to expect that the voter cannot produce a proof
that can be sent to a remote party who was unable to tap the voter’s communications. We
compare the approach with others that achieve similar objectives based on credentials or
codes. Our primary motivation is the di culty of using either the Juels- Catalano-Jakobsson
method or voting codes for preferential voting.
3.22 Internet Voting in Estonia
Alexander Trechsel (European University Institute, IT)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Alexander Trechsel
Joint work of Trechsel, Alexander; Vassil, Kristjan
Recent years has seen an increasing interest in Internet voting from the point of view of
political scientists as well as from the perspective of policy makers. Some have argued that
the introduction of e-voting boosts electoral participation by bringing down the barriers
hindering electoral turnout. Others have kept a more pessimistic view, claiming that e-voting
a ects only those few who are highly engaged in politics already. This study aims to shed light
on the topics beyond this debate. In particular, our objective is to analyze the determinants
that lead some citizens to opt for e-voting and others for traditional means of participation.
We ask the question of who is voting online and how can we explain the choice of the
voting channel? On the basis of five e-enabled elections in Estonia we demonstrate that the
introduction of internet voting has a modest e ect on aggregate levels of turnout. On the
individual level we find that choosing to vote online is associated with trust toward e-voting
system, as well as higher levels of computer literacy. Additionally we find that the language
cleavage remains an important predictor of internet voting in Estonia. Interestingly, as time
has passed since the first e-enabled elections we find that traditional determinants of e-voting,
such as age, gender, urban residence, income, etc, gradually loose their power.
3.23 What happened in Sarasota?
Dan Wallach (Rice University, US)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Dan Wallach
URL http://www.cs.rice.edu/~dwallach/pub/sarasota07.pdf
The November 2006 race for Florida’s 13th Congressional District resulted in a 369 vote
margin of victory for the winning candidate with more than 18,000 undervotes recorded
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on the ES&S iVotronic touch-screen voting machines used in Sarasota County. This talk
summarizes what happened, what theories might explain it, and what steps were taken at
the time and afterward to understand the mystery.
3.24 Swiss Elections to the National Council: First trials with e-voting
in elections at federal level
Anina Weber (Federal Chancellery – Bern, CH)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Anina Weber
Main reference Anina Weber, Geo Taglionoi, “Swiss Elections to the National Council: First trials with e-voting in
elections at federal level,” Dagstuhl Preprint Archive, arXiv:1109.2489v2 [cs.CY]
URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1109.2489v2
On October 23rd 2011, around 22,000 voters will be authorized to cast their votes electronically
in occasion of the elections to the National Council. These are the first trials ever with
e-voting in elections at federal level in Switzerland. Four cantons are going to conduct trials
with this new channel. Only Swiss voters living abroad will be authorized to participate.
The Swiss Confederation pursues the long term goal of the introduction of e-voting as a
third, complementary voting method in addition to voting in person at the polling station
and postal voting.
3.25 Verifiable voting with everlasting privacy
Jeroen van de Graaf (Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil, BR)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Jeroen van de Graaf
Main reference van de Graaf, Jeroen, “Voting with unconditional privacy: CFSY for booth voting,” unpublished
manuscript
URL http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/574
We study the Cramer, Franklin, Schoenmaker and Yung internet voting protocol for the
booth setting. In this protocol, so called Pedersen commitments are used to define an
unconditionally hiding commitment scheme. Because of its homomorphic properties, they
are particularly suited for voting protocols with unconditional privacy.
In fact, a survey shows that almost all these protocols use, or could benefit from, these
commitments. Though not novel cryptographically speaking, the protocol presented is
interesting from a voting perspective, because it is simple enough to be understood by non-
cryptographers, yet has many desirable properties, such as unconditional privacy, correctness
under the discrete log assumption, individual and universal verifiability, and (optionally)
ballot casting assurance.
In addition, we discuss interesting relations to and/or simplifications, of several other
protocols, such as the booth voting protocol of Moran and Naor, SplitBallot, MarkPledge
and Scratch & Vote.
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4 Panel Discussions
4.1 What are the obstacles to improving the integrity of election
systems?
This panel discussion was held the first afternoon of the seminar. Moderated by Michael
Alvarez, participants in the discussion were David Beirne, Candice Hoke, Robert Krimmer
and Alexander Trechsel.
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